

dashes in the Oxford text,<sup>10</sup> will contribute to the vividness and drama of *Phaedo*'s report of the death scene (and will preclude incidentally that somewhat unseemly conceit, mentioned above, which would have Socrates' friends gathering around and touching or squeezing his stiffening limbs), but it may also serve a more important purpose. Gill has summarized what is known, both from ancient sources and modern toxicology, about the effects of hemlock poisoning and compared Plato's account of its effects on Socrates.<sup>11</sup> Plato, he concludes, has been highly selective in his description, apparently choosing not to include the more gruesome effects, as recorded especially by Nicander and verified by modern toxicologists—in particular, the inevitable nausea, choking, and convulsions.<sup>12</sup> He suggests that Plato may have wanted to affirm Socrates' stamina and stoicism in the face of death, and also simply to omit ugly details from his depiction of the death scene; but above all, by concentrating on Socrates' gradual loss of sensation, he may have intended to illustrate 'in visual form' his presentation in *Phaedo* of death as the soul's liberation from the body. Rowe quotes from Gill's paper with evident approval, but thinks that Plato may allude to 'the less pleasant effects of the poison'; the phrase *ἐφαπτόμενος αὐτοῦ* may imply that the warden has 'taken hold' of Socrates in anticipation of possible convulsions. I should suggest, however, that the words *καὶ αὐτὸς ἤπτετο*, as transposed, are meant to underline the fact that there were no convulsions,<sup>13</sup> that there was no need for Socrates' friends to help the warden hold him down in the expected death throes of hemlock poisoning: 'he alone actually was holding him'.

As for the presumed misplacement of *καὶ αὐτὸς ἤπτετο*, unrecognized parentheses regularly find themselves suffering misplacement in the manuscripts; initial emphatic *καί* rendered this one especially vulnerable.

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<sup>10</sup> *κατεκλίνῃ ὑπτιος—οὕτω γὰρ ἐκέλευεν ὁ ἄνθρωπος—καὶ ἄμα* (117e5); . . . *καὶ ἐκκαλυψάμενος—ἐνεκεκάλυπτο γάρ—εἶπεν—ὁ δὲ τελευταῖον ἐφθέγγατο—* (118a6–7).

<sup>11</sup> C. Gill, 'The death of Socrates', *CQ* 23 (1973), 25–8.

<sup>12</sup> Burnet, in Appendix I of his edition (above, n. 4), confesses that 'it is disturbing to be told, as we are by some authorities, that hemlock-juice would produce quite different symptoms', that is, from those described by Plato. But of course there was never any assurance that the death scene in *Phaedo* is historically accurate. There is no guarantee that even Socrates' celebrated last words, as recorded in the dialogue, are truly 'historical' (*pace* G. W. Most, 'A cock for Asclepius', *CQ* 43 [1993], 96–111).

<sup>13</sup> On *ἐκινήθη* (Socrates' final movement), which Rowe also thinks may allude to the poisoning's grimmer effects, see W. D. Geddes, *Platonis Phaedo* (London, 1885), 188: 'Probably not more than "he quivered". Convulsion *in articulo mortis* was, when violent, indicated by *σφαδάζω*.'

#### PLATO, *REPUBLIC* 9.585c–d

The sentence that appears in the best MSS at *Republic* 585c—'*Ἡ οὖν αἰὲρ ὁμοίου οὐσίας οὐσίας τι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐπιστήμης μετέχει*—makes no satisfactory sense in the context of the argument of which it is part. Many emendations have been proposed, but in recent decades this effort seems to have petered out. In general, we are slower to propose emendations these days; and in particular, modern translators of the *Republic* may have been swayed by the authority of Burnet's Oxford Classical Text, which prints the sentence unemended. At any rate, they translate the sentence as it

stands in Burnet, and without indicating that many have considered it problematic.<sup>1</sup> In my edition of a new translation of the *Republic* by Griffith,<sup>2</sup> I have ventured to emend the text at 585c. Our modern hesitation to emend is no bad thing, especially when the text is one on which the best MSS all agree, as in this case. But it is one thing to refrain from emending a text, and quite another to refrain from questioning it. Even if the emendation adopted in this new translation fails to convince—and it is not without its own problems, as one might expect when dealing with a passage that has proven a persistent crux—still it will have served its purpose if it succeeds in reminding scholars that a problem exists.

The fundamental problem with the sentence is that, in context, it makes a point about the covariance of being, knowledge, and truth; but this point is simply not relevant to the conclusion at which the argument aims. The problem is not so much that the transmitted text offers a bad argument. Few philosophers are above producing bad arguments on occasion, and Plato need have been no exception. The problem is generated rather by the fact that the overall aim and the basic strategy of the argument at 585b–e is straightforward, and has never been in serious dispute. It seems quite plain what *ought* to occupy the position in this argument currently occupied by the sentence at 585c; but the transmitted text does not do the job—does not even come close to doing the job. That is the problem.

The undisputed aim of the argument at 585b–e is to show that satisfaction of the soul is superior to bodily satisfaction. The argument's basic strategy is to demonstrate that the soul is more really, more genuinely (*μᾶλλον ὄντως*) 'filled' by its proper objects, those that naturally satisfy its needs, than is the body by its proper objects. The more genuine fulfilment, it is then argued, makes for the more genuine pleasure. The quality of the fulfilment is for its part inferred from the quality of the objects, from the fact that food for the soul—knowledge, true belief, understanding, and the like—'is more' (*μᾶλλον εἶναι*, 585c3), is more substantial, we might say, than food for the body. In this argument, knowledge takes the role of food or object for the soul. But that is not the role it plays in the problematic sentence at 585c. There it is related instead to being or substantiality—the being of that which is always the same. To judge from the translations, the argument at this point is generally thought to run as follows:

'And does the being of that which is always the same share any more in being than it does in knowledge?'

'Not at all.'

'Any more than it does in truth?'

'Again, no.'

<sup>1</sup> In an appendix to Book 9 of his edition, in which he justifies his own emendation, Adam reviews alternative proposals (J. Adam, *The Republic of Plato* 2 [Cambridge, 1902 (1963)], 381–3). He lists emendations by Hermann, Müller, Madvig, Baiter, and Stallbaum. (Stallbaum, however, confined his proposal for emendation to a note; he did not include it in his text.) Older editors and translators other than Burnet who refrain from emendation include Schneider, Schleiermacher, Ast, and Jowett and Campbell. Hermann's emendation (see n. 3) is followed in Paul Shorey's Loeb translation of 1935, and a close variant of it is followed in the Italian translation of G. Fraccaroli (1932), in the French translation of E. Chambry (1948), and in the German translation of R. Rufener (1950). The Spanish translation of J. Pabon and M. Galiano (1949) follows Adam. Cornford in his Oxford translation of 1941 recognizes that the passage at 585c is problematic but chooses (in a footnote) to emend a different sentence from the one in question here. In the final paragraph of this article I acknowledge those scholars whose emendations are closest to the one I propose; but I have not attempted systematic criticism of alternative proposals.

<sup>2</sup> G. R. F. Ferrari (ed.), *Plato: The Republic*, trans. Tom Griffith (Cambridge, 2000).

'And if it shared less in truth, would it not also share less in being?'  
'Necessarily.'

*Ἡ οὖν ἀεὶ ὁμοίου οὐσίας οὐσίας τι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐπιστήμης μετέχει;*  
*Οὐδαμῶς.*  
*Τί δ'; ἀληθείας;*  
*Οὐδέ τοῦτο.*  
*Εἰ δὲ ἀληθείας ἤττον, οὐ καὶ οὐσίας;*  
*Ἀνάγκη.*

This is a sudden and inexplicable turn of reasoning. The lines immediately preceding these offer a criterion by which to decide which has more being, the soul's or the body's proper objects. In general, 'that which is connected with what is always the same, immortal and true—itself possessing these qualities, and being found in the context of things with these qualities' (τὸ τοῦ ἀεὶ ὁμοίου ἐχόμενον καὶ ἀθανάτου καὶ ἀληθείας, καὶ αὐτὸ τοιοῦτον ὃν καὶ ἐν τοιούτῳ γιγνόμενον) will have more being than 'that which is connected with what is never the same, and mortal—itself possessing those qualities, and being found in the context of things with those qualities' (τὸ μηδέποτε ὁμοίου καὶ θνητοῦ, καὶ αὐτὸ τοιοῦτον ὃν καὶ ἐν τοιούτῳ γιγνόμενον). The lines immediately following the disputed portion of the argument present a conclusion:

'As a general rule, then, will the kinds of things involved in care of the body have a smaller share both of truth and of being than the kinds involved in care of the soul?'  
'Much smaller.'

*Οὐκοῦν ὅλως τὰ περὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος θεραπείαν γένη τῶν γενῶν αὐτῶν περὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς θεραπείαν ἤττον ἀληθείας τε καὶ οὐσίας μετέχει;*  
*Πολύ γε.*

The intervening passage, accordingly, ought to establish that the soul's proper objects rather than the body's meet the criterion for having more being, and ought also to link the share of being possessed by those objects with their share of truth.

But how could the traditional text be pressed into this service? Although it does make the link between a thing's share of being and its share of truth, the subject whose share of being and of truth is in question is 'the being of that which is always the same', and not, as we would expect, food for the soul in contrast to food for the body. And rather than establish that it is food for the soul that meets the criterion for having more being—presumably by establishing its connection to what is always the same—the traditional text takes what is always the same as its topic, and asks, pointlessly, after its share of being, knowledge, and truth.<sup>3</sup>

Clarity and point return if the text at 585c7–8 is emended thus:

*ἢ οὖν ἀεὶ ὁμοίου οὐσίας τι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐπιστήμη μετέχει;*

'Well, does anything have a greater share in the being of what is always the same than knowledge does?'

<sup>3</sup> A similar objection applies to the text as emended by Hermann. He changes the subject from *ἡ ἀεὶ ὁμοίου οὐσία* to *ἡ ἀνομοίου οὐσία*. The variant adopted by several translators (see n. 1) is *ἡ ἀεὶ ἀνομοίου οὐσία*. But it is just as pointless in context to take the being of what is not, or never, the same and ask after its share of being, knowledge, and truth as it is to ask this question of what is always the same.

Consider the run of argument at 585c–d with this as our text. Socrates produces his criterion for deciding whether what satisfies the soul's needs has more being than what satisfies the body's, and then asks, in effect, whether anything meets it better than knowledge does. The phrase *ἀεὶ ὁμοίου οὐσίας μετέχει* takes up the first part of that criterion. Knowledge is, *par excellence*, connected with what is always the same, itself possessing that quality and being found in the context of things with that quality; for knowledge that is worthy of the name is itself permanent and unvarying, and is associated with the unvarying forms, among which it belongs (cf. *Phaedrus* 247d), and which it takes as object. (I understand the phrase *καὶ αὐτὸ τοιοῦτον ὃν καὶ ἐν τοιοῦτῳ γιγνόμενον* as an explanation of *ἐχόμενον* rather than as introducing new factors.) Glaucon, who back in Book 5 had volunteered enthusiastic praise of knowledge over mere opinion (477e: 'How could anyone with any sense ever regard what is infallible as the same as what is not infallible?'), is happy to confirm the exalted rank that Socrates suggests for it here.

Socrates proceeds to the second part of the criterion for deciding what has more being:

*Τί δ'; ἀληθείας < sc. τι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐπιστήμη μετέχει >;*

'Does anything have a greater share in truth than knowledge does?'<sup>4</sup>

Again the answer is no, for knowledge, being infallible, is *par excellence* both itself true (*αὐτὸ τοιοῦτον ὃν*) and associated with what is true (*καὶ ἐν τοιοῦτῳ γιγνόμενον*). The two questions about knowledge should both of course be understood to exclude from comparison the objects in which it shares. That is, 'anything' implies 'anything other than the ever-same itself' and 'anything other than the truth itself'.

Socrates is engaged in ranking what nourishes the soul against what nourishes the body. Knowledge, so far as its connection with the ever-same and with truth goes, is representative of the whole range of appropriate foods for the soul mentioned at b14–c1. If nothing has a greater share than knowledge in what is always the same and in truth, then what satisfies the body will certainly have a lesser share, and so have less being. Socrates gets to this conclusion by asking

*Εἰ δὲ ἀληθείας ἥττον < sc. μετέχει τι >, οὐ καὶ οὐσίας;  
Ἀνάγκη.*

'And if anything has a smaller share in truth, doesn't it also have a smaller share in being?'  
'Necessarily.'

This had been left implicit at c2–6—where *ἀλήθεια*, unlike *τὸ ἀεὶ ὅμοιον* and *τὸ ἀθάνατον*, is not matched with an opposite—and is worth making explicit now. Socrates arrives at the interim conclusion:

<sup>4</sup> There is a third term in the criterion stated at 585c1–5: in addition to the connection with what is always the same and with the truth Socrates mentions a connection with 'the immortal', *ἀθάνατον*. This does not reappear. It is presumably to be thought of as included under the concept of that which is always the same, and is mentioned chiefly for the sake of the contrast with *τὸ μηδέποτε ὁμοίου καὶ θνητοῦ < ἐχόμενον >*, 'what is never the same, and mortal'.

Οὐκοῦν ὅλως τὰ περὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος θεραπείαν γένη τῶν γενῶν αὐ τῶν περὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς θεραπείαν ἥττον ἀληθείας τε καὶ οὐσίας μετέχει;

'As a general rule, then, will the kinds of things involved in care of the body have a smaller share both of truth and of being than the kinds involved in care of the soul?'<sup>5</sup>

I turn now from philosophic to linguistic considerations. The emended text fits Platonic usage without much difficulty. Perhaps the best parallel for the overall form of Socrates' question is *Republic* 485c10: Ἡ οὖν οἰκειότερον σοφία τι ἀληθείας ἂν εὖροις;<sup>6</sup> The absence of the article with οὐσίας (ἡ οὖν αἰὲ ὁμοίου οὐσίας... μετέχει;) may seem odd, but is also found, for example, at *Meno* 72b1 (μελίττης περὶ οὐσίας) and *Theaetetus* 207c3 (ἐπιστήμονα περὶ ἀμάξης οὐσίας)—both examples involving a double genitive as in the emended text. The phrase αἰὲ ὁμοίου οὐσία would indeed be unusual if it were simply a periphrasis for τὸ αἰὲ ὁμοιον, but in fact it expresses a broader concept. To 'share in the being of what is always the same' is not simply to possess its quality but, as described at 585c1–3, to be found in the context of things with this quality. The more complex relation is recalled by a correspondingly complex phrase.

Probably the most awkward aspect of the emended text is that τι μᾶλλον is not here the adverbial phrase that it is, almost invariably, elsewhere in Plato<sup>7</sup>—indeed, that it is predominantly in prose of the fifth and fourth centuries. Of thirty-five instances of the phrase in Plato (omitting the spuria), fully twenty-three occur with οὐδέν or μηδέν (once with μή) preceding; another five are clearly adverbial; three occur as the adverbial interrogative phrase τί μᾶλλον;. One instance is ambiguous: *Theaetetus* 182e3, Οὔτε ἄρα ὁρᾶν προσρητέον τι μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ ὁρᾶν, is taken by some to mean 'Nor then should anything be called seeing rather than not-seeing'; but others take it to mean 'Nor then should it be called seeing any more than not-seeing.' *Phaedrus* 278d5, however, is unequivocal: τὸ δὲ ἡ φιλόσοφον ἢ τοιοῦτόν τι μᾶλλον τε ἂν αὐτῷ καὶ ἀρμόττει καὶ ἐμμελεστέως ἔχει can only mean 'to call him a lover of wisdom, or something like this, would suit him better and be more fitting'. This sentence, although not a precise parallel, does at least demonstrate that Plato was capable of writing the indefinite τι next to μᾶλλον without associating the two in a single adverbial phrase.<sup>8</sup> Moreover, if the emended text is correct, the fact that the words τι μᾶλλον invite an adverbial reading would likely have contributed to its subsequent corruption.

<sup>5</sup> Strictly speaking, Socrates should concern himself in this conclusion only with the share of being possessed by the two kinds of nourishment—which is what he set out to decide at 585b12—and not also with their share of truth. But the pairing is natural in Plato, and prepares the ground for the ultimate conclusion that pleasures of the soul are both more genuine and more true (ὄντως τε καὶ ἀληθεστέως, 585e1).

<sup>6</sup> Here τι is object rather than subject. For a case where ἡ οὖν introduces a question in which τι is subject, see *Republic* 609c2. (All searches of the corpus for this article were conducted on the databank of the TLG, CD-ROM #D, using the Pandora search program.)

<sup>7</sup> At *Republic* 374b4 there is even an example in a question introduced by ἡ οὖν: Ἡ οὖν τι σκυτικῆς δεῖ μᾶλλον κηδεσθαι ἢ πολεμικῆς;.

<sup>8</sup> A partial parallel that involves the interrogative rather than the indefinite is *Laws* 891b4: νόμοις οὖν διαφθειρομένοις τοῖς μεγίστοις ὑπὸ κακῶν ἀνθρώπων τίνα καὶ μᾶλλον προσήκει βοηθεῖν ἢ νομοθέτην;. Here the type of question asked is parallel to that in the proposed emendation, except that the interrogation is marked not by ἡ οὖν but by the interrogative τίνα. The following two cases from Aristotle's *Topics* are worthy of note: εἴ τι μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον λέγεται (115b3), 'if anything is described as "more" or "less"', and especially ἡ εἴ τι μᾶλλον τούτου τέλος (151a12), 'or if anything is more its end than this is', since it involves a subjective genitive after μᾶλλον as in the proposed emendation.

The first step along the path by which the text reached its current condition may well have been the misinterpretation of ἡ as ῆ. This would lead to οὐσία, and by conflation of variants to οὐσία οὐσίας. Finally, ἐπιστήμη preceded by οὐσίας and followed by μετέχει all too readily became ἐπιστήμης.<sup>9</sup>

The emendation proposed here is in the spirit of those proposed long ago by Apelt<sup>10</sup> and by Garrod<sup>11</sup>—both of whom grasped the essential point that Socrates' question at 585c7–8 was 'does anything have a greater share of x than knowledge does?' However, the 'x' in question, for them, is οὐσία simply, rather than ἡ τοῦ ἀεὶ ὁμοίου οὐσία. This makes for a less satisfactory connection of thought with the preceding context. Another ancestor who should be mentioned is Bury<sup>12</sup> (followed by Vretska<sup>13</sup>), who proposes ἡ οὖν ἀεὶ ὁμοίου σιτία μᾶλλον ἢ ἐπιστήμη μετέχει;. My own proposal makes similar sense of the argument, but is a more straightforward emendation.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> I owe the reasoning in this paragraph to Donald Mastronarde—whom I also thank for his helpful criticism of an earlier draft of this piece.

<sup>10</sup> Otto Apelt, review of J. Adam, *The Republic of Plato*, *Wochenschrift für klassische Philologie* 13 (1903), 338–50, at 348–50.

<sup>11</sup> H. W. Garrod, 'Two passages of the *Republic*', *CR* 20 (1906), 209–12, at 210–12.

<sup>12</sup> R. G. Bury, 'On Plato, *Republic* IX. 585c–d', *CR* 13 (1899), 289–90.

<sup>13</sup> Karl Vretska, 'Platonica III', *WS* 71 (1958), 30–54, at 52–4.

<sup>14</sup> Both Bury and Vretska claim that the use of ὅλως at 585d1 indicates that some particular bodily food has been previously mentioned. But a sufficient contrast between particular and general is also set up, on my proposal, by the question 'and if anything [i.e. if any particular thing] has a smaller share in truth, doesn't it also have a smaller share in being?' Adam (n. 1) compares his own proposal to Bury's, since it too makes ἐπιστήμη (to be exact, ἡ ἐπιστήμης <οὐσία>) the subject of μετέχει. The shortcomings of Adam's proposal in other respects are well brought out by Apelt (n. 10). In revising this article I have benefited from the criticism of an anonymous reader for *CQ* and from objections to my emendation contained in an as yet unpublished piece by Paul-Jon Benson and Jay Elliott.

#### NEW LIGHT ON AN OLD CRUX: PLATO, *PHILEBUS* 66a8\*

Πάντη δὴ φήσεις, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ὑπὸ τε ἀγγέλων πέμπων καὶ παροῦσι φράζων,  
ὡς ἡδονὴ κτήμα οὐκ ἔστι πρῶτον οὐδ' αὖ δεύτερον, ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν πῇ περὶ  
μέτρον καὶ τὸ μέτριον καὶ καίριον καὶ πάντα ὅποσα χρή τοιαῦτα νομίζειν, τὴν †  
αἰδιδίον ἡρῆσθαι. (Phil. 66 a4–8)

a8 τὴν αἰδιδίον BTW, Eusebius, *P.E.* 14.21.6, Stobaeus, *Ecl.* 3.6.68, Damascius p.121 W. (ut vid.):  
τινὰ ἡδιδίον γρ. W in marg. ἡρῆσθαι (ηρ– B) BW, Stobaei LM<sup>d</sup>: εἰρῆσθαι φάσιν (hoc acc.) T,  
Eusebii ON (φασίν): εἰρῆσθαι φύσιν Parisinus 1812 (e corr.).

This is the manuscript evidence. I have checked Diès's report of T and W by means of photographs in my possession; for B I have used the facsimile published by Allen.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> *Plato, Codex Oxoniensis Clarkianus 39 phototypice editus*, praefatus est Th. G. Allen (Leiden, 1898–9).